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Abstract
Secure multi-party computation (MPC) is a subfield of cryptography. Its aim is
creating methods for multiple parties to jointly compute a function over their inputs
meanwhile keeping their inputs privately. The Secure Compare problem, introduced
by Yao under the name millionaire’s problem, is an important problem in MPC. On
the other hand, Privacy Preserving Machine Learning (PPML) is an intersectional field
of cryptography and machine learning. It allows a group of independent data owners
to collaboratively learn a model over their data sets without exposing their private
data. MPC is a common cryptographic technique commonly used in PPML. In Deep
learning, ReLU is an important layer. In order to train neural network to use MPC,
we need an MPC protocol for ReLU and DReLU (the derivative of ReLU) in forward
propagation and backward propagation of neural network respectively. In this paper,
we give two new tools “ G-module action” and “G-module recover” for MPC protocol,
and use them to give the protocols for Secure Compare, DReLU and ReLU. The total
communication in online and offline of our protocols is much less than the state of the
art.
1 Introduction
Secure multi-party computation (MPC) is a subfield of cryptography with the goal of
creating methods for parties to jointly compute a function over their inputs while keeping
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those inputs privately. Privacy Preserving Machine Learning (PPML) is an intersectional
field of cryptography and machine learning. It allows a group of independent data owners to
collaboratively learn a model over their data sets without exposing their private data. MPC
is a common cryptographic techniques widely used in PPML. In Deep learning, ReLU is an
important layer. In order to train neural network to use MPC, we need an MPC protocol
for both ReLU and DReLU in forward propagation and backward propagation of neural
network respectively.
In [4], an MPC protocol to compute DReLU and ReLU is given, its technological
roadmap is as in Figure 1. First, a Private Compare protocol (PC) is given, then the
Share Convert protocol (SC) is given based on the PC. Second, a Matrix Multiplication
Protocol (MatMul) is given, a Most Significant Bit protocol (MSB) is based on the PC
and the MatMul, then a DReLU protocol is given based on both MSB and SC, and a
Select Shares protocol (SS) is also given based on the protocol MatMul. Finally, a ReLU
protocol is given based on the protocol DReLU and the protocol SS.
In [12], PRF is used to reduce the communication in [4].
In our paper, the technological roadmap of MPC protocol for ReLU is in given Figure
3. Our the protocol of DReLU is based on the protocol Secure Compare (SC). Secure
Comparison is a classical problem in MPC, it has been widely studied, for example, in [5],
[7], [8], [9] and so on. We give a protocol (Lemma 5.1 ) to reduce the DReLU of the Secure
Compare problem without any extra communication. This reduce protocol has been given
in Lemma 3 in [5] for the recursion of Secure Compare problem also. But we shall supply
a much simpler proof of it principle than that of [5].
For the Secure Compare problem, we give a new Secure Compare protocol SC(n),
which have minimal total communication (offline+online) compare to the state of art. In
particular, we give the MPC protocols “G-module recover” and an MPC protocol for Se-
cure Comparison based on the protocol G-module recover. One can compare our Secure
Comparison protocol with the protocol in Secure Comparison protocol in [5], Secure Com-
parison protocol in [7], [8], [9]. The total communication (online+offline) of our protocols
is much less than others (Table 4.3).
We also give an MPC protocols “Cross G-module action” and an MPC protocol for
Secure Select Share based on the protocol Cross G-module action. Still one can compare our
Secure Select Share protocol with that of [4] on both the round and total communication,
our protocol is smaller (Table 6.1).
We can combine our DReLU protocol and Secure Select Share protocol to give our
ReLU protocol. Compared with the DReLU, ReLU protocol in [4] and [12], our DReLU,
ReLU protocols are smaller in the round and communication (Table 5.2 and Table 7).
Besides our protocol is very safe under the commodity model [10], since the assistant
third party P2 only sends message to the parties P0, P1 in offline phase. In online phase,
just P0 and P1 play the protocol. The assistant third party P2 does not need to receive any
message from the P0, P1 at all. The security and robustness of our protocol is much better
than that in [4], where the assistant third party needs to both send and receive message
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online.
Let (A, +) be an abelian group, for an element x in A, we call (xL, xR) ∈ A2 the share
representation of x ∈ A , if and only if x = xL + xR.
If P0, P1 are two parties, we say “P0, P1 hold the share representation of x in A”, it
means that P0 holds an xL ∈ A, P1 holds an xR ∈ A such that xL + xR = x.
2 The MPC protocol about G-module
In this section, we give three MPC protocols about G-module: the G-module action pro-
tocol, the cross G-module action protocol and the G-module recover protocol.
2.1 The MPC protocol for the G-module action
Let G be a finite group, and let A be a finite G- module [2]. If P0 possesses an element
g ∈ G and P1 possesses an element a ∈ A, we will give the following protocol for computing
the share representation of ga ∈ A.
Algorithm 1: G-Module: GM(G,A)
Input: P0 holds an element g ∈ G and P1 holds an element a ∈ A.
Output: P0, P1 obtain the share representation of ga ∈ A.
1: P2 generates random h ∈ G and b ∈ A, and splits hb as u0 + u1 ∈ A;
2: P2 sends h and u0 to P0 while sends b and u1 to P1;
3: P0 computes f := h
−1g ∈ G and then sends it to P1;
4: P1 computes c := fa− b ∈ A and then sends it to P0;
5: P0 computes w = hc+ u0 ∈ A
6: return (w, u1).
This protocol needs 2 rounds, and its communication is 2(log |G|+ 2 log |A|) bits.
But if we use PRF improvement, we need log |A| bits communication in offline phase,
and log |G|+ log |A| bits communication in 1 round in online phase per calling.
In fact, P0, P1 can get (h, u0) and (b, u1) as follows: LetP0, P1 and P2 share a PRF
F : K × Z/NZ −→ G×A
(k , i) 7→ Fk(i)
let P0 and P2 share a key k0, P1 and P1 share a key k1. In offline phase, for i ∈ Z/NZ,
P2 uses k0 as a PRF key to generate (hi, ui,0) = Fk0(i) and k1 as a PRF key to generate
h˜i, bi) = Fk1(i), then computes ui.1 := hibi − ui,0 and finally sends it to P1. P1 stores
{ui,1}i. In i−th calling this protocol in online phase, P0 uses k0 to generate (hi, ui,0) =
Fk0(i), and P1 uses k1 to generate (h˜i, bi) = Fk1(i), and restores ui,1. Hence, the offline
communication of GM(G,A) protocol is log |A| bits per calling (for sending ui,1 to P1), the
online communication is log |G|+ log |A| bits in 1 round per calling.
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Figure 1: Roadmap in Se-
cureNN
Figure 2: Roadmap in [5]. Figure 3: Roadmap in this paper.
Table 2.1: Communication of GM(G,A)
Protocol offline com. online comm. online round total comm.
GM(G,A) log |A| log |G|+ log |A| 1 log |G|+ 2 log |A|
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2.2 The MPC protocol for the cross G-module action
Let G be a finite abelian group, and A be a finite G- module [2]. If P0 holds g0 ∈ G, a0 ∈ A
and P1 holds g1 ∈ G, a1 ∈ A, we will give a protocol for computing the share representation
of g0a1 + g1a0 ∈ A.
The principle is like
g0a1 + g1a0 = h0(h
−1
0 g0a1 − b1) + h1(h−11 g1a0 − b0) + h0b1 + h1b0
where g0, g1, h0, h1 ∈ G and a0, a1, b0, b1 ∈ A.
Algorithm 2: Cross G-Module Action: CGM(G,A)
Input: P0 holds g0 ∈ G, a0 ∈ A, P1 holds g1 ∈ G, a1 ∈ A.
Output: P0, P1 get the share representation of g0a1 + g1a0 ∈ A.
1: P2 generates random h0, h1 ∈ G and b0, b1 ∈ A, and splits h0b1 + h1b0 as u0 + u1 ∈ A;
2: P2 sends h0, b0 and u0 to P0 and sends h1, b1 and u1 to P1, respectively;
3: P0 computes f1 := h
−1
0 g0 ∈ G and sends it to P1; P1 computes f0 := h−11 g1 ∈ G and
sends it to P0;
4: P0 computes c1 := f0a0 − b0 ∈ A and sends it to P1; P1 computes c0 := f1a1 − b1 ∈ A
and sends it to P0;
5: P0 computes w0 := h0c0 + u0 ∈ A, P1 computes w1 := h1c1 + u1 ∈ A
6: return (w0, w1).
This protocol needs 2 rounds, and its communication is 4 log |G| + 6 log |A| bits. But
if we use PRF improvement, similarly to the protocol GM(G,A), we shall need log |A| bits
communication in offline phase, and 2 log |G|+ 2 log |A| bits communication in 1 round in
online phase per calling. Hence the communication can be presented as the following Table
2.2.
Table 2.2: Communication of CGM(G,A)
Protocol offline com. online comm. online round total comm.
CGM(G,A) log |A| 2 log |G|+ 2 log |A| 1 2 log |G|+ 3 log |A|
2.3 The MPC protocol for the G-module recover
Let G be a finite group, and let A be a finite G- module. Under the action of G, A has the
G-orbit decomposition [1] as below:
A =
∐
i
Ai
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where Ai = Gai can be generated by any single element ai ∈ Ai under the Group action
of G.
Let P0, P1 hold a share representation (b0, b1) of an element b ∈ A, and have a common
information on the orbit of b under the G-action. We will give an MPC protocol for the
G-module recover, i.e., in the end of the protocol, P0 will get an element g ∈ G and P1 will
get an element a ∈ Gb ⊂ A (here Gb is the orbit of b under the G-action) such that ga = b.
The idea comes from the following equation
g−1(b0 + b1) = g−1(b0 + b1 − v0 − v1) + g−1(v0 + v1)
and the algorithm is given as below:
Algorithm 3: G-Module Recover: GMR(G,A)
Input: P0, P1 hold a share representation (b0, b1) of an element b ∈ A, and a common
information on the orbit B := Gb of b under the group action of G.
Output: P0 gets an element g ∈ G and P1 gets an element a ∈ Gb such that ga = b.
1: P2 generates random g ∈ G and u ∈ A, and splits gu as v0 + v1 ∈ A;
2: P2 sends g and v0 to P0 and sends u and v1 to P1, respectively;
3: P1 computes c1 = b1 − v1 ∈ A and send it to P0;
4: P0 computes w = g
−1(b0 − v0 + c1) ∈ A and sends it to P1;
5: P1 computes a := w + u ∈ A;
6: return (g, a).
Proof of the security of the Algorithm 3: It is easy to see that the conditional dis-
tribution P (c1 = x|g, v0, b0, B, b1) = P (v1 = b1 − x|g, v0, b0, B) = P (v1 = b1 − x|g, v0) is a
uniform distribution on A. Hence the posterior distribution P (b1|g, v0, b0, B, c1) is equal to
the prior distribution P (b1|g, v0, b0, B). Therefore P0 can’t get any information on b1 from
(g, v0, b0, B, c1). Similarly since the conditional distribution P (w = x|u, v1, b1, B, b0) =
P (g−1(b0 + b1) − u = x|u, v1, b1, B, b0) = P (g−1(b0 + b1) − u = x|u,B) is a uniform dis-
tribution on −u + B, the posterior distribution P (b0|u, v1, b1, B,w) is equal to the prior
distribution P (b0|u, v1, b1, B). And therefore P1 can’t get any information on b0 from
(u, v1, b1, B,w).
Analysis of communication: Now we give an analysis of the communication of the G-
module recover. This protocol needs 2 rounds, and its communication is log |G|+ 5 log |A|
bits. However if we use the PRF improvement, similarly to the case of GM(G,A), we
need only log |A| bits communication in offline phase, and 2 log |A| bits communication in
1 round in online phase per calling which can be shown as in Table 2.3.
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Table 2.3: Communication of GMR(G,A)
Protocol offline com. online comm. online round total comm.
GMR(G,A) log |A| 2 log |A| 1 3 log |A|
3 Some known protocols
In this section, we give a review of two well known MPC protocols, namely, the MPC
protocol for assistant occasional transmission (AOT) and the MPC protocol for module
transform:
3.1 MPC protocol for Assistant OT
Let A, B be two finite abelian groups, and let Map(A,B) be the set consisting of all the
map from A to B. There is a natural abelian group structure on Map(A,B) induced from
B. Precisely, for any k ∈ A, Let
Lk : Map(A,B) −→Map(A,B)
be the “left shift” on Map(A, B), which is defined by Lk(f)(i) = f(i + k) with f ∈
Map(A,B) and i ∈ A. Then we have
(g − Li−jf)(j) = g(j)− f(i)
for any f, g ∈Map(A,B) and any i, j ∈ A. And the algorithm is as below:
Algorithm 4: Assistant OT : AOT(A,B)
Input: P0 holds g ∈Map(A,B), P1 holds j ∈ A.
Output: P1 gets g(j) ∈ B.
1: P2 generates random i ∈ A, f ∈Map(A,B) then sends f to P0 and i and f(i) to P1
respectively;
2: P1 computes k := i− j and sends k to P0;
3: P0 computes h := g − Lkf ∈Map(A,B), and sends h to P1;
4: P1 computes h(j) + f(i), which is equal to g(j).
This MPC protocol needs 2 rounds, and its communication is 2|A| log |B|+ 2 log |A|+
log |B| bits. But if we use PRF improvement, similarly to the protocol of GM(G,A),
we need only log |B| bits communication in offline phase, and |A| log |B| + log |A| bits
communication in 1 round in online phase per calling which is shown as Table 3.1.
7
Table 3.1: Communication of AOT(A,B)
Protocol offline com. online comm. online round total comm.
AOT(A,B) log |B| |A| log |B|+ log |A| 1 |A| log |B|+ log |A|+ log |B|
3.2 MPC protocol for Module Transform
Now let P0, P1 hold a share representation of a ∈ F2, and a common integral number m.
Following the MPC protocol MoT(m) in [5], at the end of the protocol, P0, P1 shall get
the share representation of a ∈ Z/mZ.
Let
I : F2 −→ Z/mZ
be a map defined by I(0) = 0, I(1) = 1. One can use the protocol to compute I(a). The
explicit algorithm is as below:
Algorithm 5: Module Transform: MoT(m)
Input: P0, P1 hold a share representation of a ∈ F2, and a common integral number m.
Output: P0, P1 get the share representation of a in Z/mZ.
1: P2 generates random u ∈ F2, then splits u into (u0, u1) ∈ F2 × F2 and I(u) ∈ Z/mZ
into (b0, b1) ∈ Z/mZ× Z/mZ, and finally sends (u0, b0) to P0, send (u1, b1) to P1
respectively;
2: P0 computes z0 := a0 − u0 locally and P1 computes z1 := a1 − u1 locally;
3: P0 and P1 reconstruct z := a− u by interchanging z0 and z1;
4: P0 computes y0 := (−1)zb0 ∈ Z/mZ and P1 computes y1 := (−1)zb1 + z ∈ Z/mZ;
5: return (y0, y1).
This protocol need 2 rounds, and its communication is 2(logm + 2) bits. However if
we use PRF improvement, we need logm bits communication in offline phase, and 2 bits
communication in 1 round in online phase per calling.
In fact, P0, P1 can obtain (u0, b0) and (u1, b1) as follows. Let P0, P1 and P2 have a
common PRF improvement by the map
F : K × Z/NZ −→ F2 ×Map(F2,Z/mZ)
(k , i) 7−→ Fk(i))
Let P0 and P2 share a key k0, P1 and P2 share a key k1. In offline phase, for i ∈ Z/NZ, P2
shall use k0 as PRF key to generate (ui,0, bi,0) = Fk0(i) and use k1 as PRF key to generate
(ui,1, b˜i,1) = Fk1(i), then computes bi.1 := I(x− ui,0 − ui,1)− fi,0, and finally sends bi.1 to
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Table 3.2: Communication of MoT(m)
Protocol offline com. online comm. online round total comm.
MoT(m) logm 2 1 logm+ 2
P1. P1 will store {bi.1}i∈Z/NZ. In the i-th calling of this protocol in online phase, P0 uses
k0 to generate (ui,0, bi,0) = Fk0(i); P1 uses k1 to generate (ui,1, b˜i,1) = Fk1(i), and restore
bi,1. Hence, the offline communication of MoT(m) protocol is logm bits per calling (for
sending bi,1 to P1), and the online communication of MoT(m) protocol is 2 bits per calling
(for interchanging z0 and z1) as shown in Table 3.2.
4 MPC protocol for security comparison
In this section we will supply an MPC protocol for security comparison. For that purpose we
will first give the protocol for searching the first non-zero bit, and once this is done one can
complete the whole procedure of security comparison by much less communication. And
then we shall finish this section by supplying the MPC protocol of the security comparison.
For a positive integer n, below we shall often use the notation
In = {0, 1, · · · , n− 1}
4.1 MPC protocol to search first non-zero bit
Let p ≥ n+ 2 be a prime number, and let P0, P1 hold a share representation of a non-zero
0− 1 vector x = (xi)n−1i=0 in Fnp . Here 0− 1 vector x = (xi)n−1i=0 is a vector satisfying
xi = 0 or 1, ∀ i ∈ In & ∃ xj = 1, j ∈ In
We will give an MPC protocol to search the first non-zero bit of x. At the end of the
protocol, P0, P1 will get the share representation of min{i : xi 6= 0} which is in Z/nZ.
Let G := Z/nZn (F×p )n be the semi-direct product of the groups Z/nZ and (F×p )n ([3]).
The underlying set of the group G is the Cartesian product Z/nZ× (F×p )n while the group
operation is defined by
G×G −→ G
((i, a), (j, b)) 7−→ (i+ j, TaLi(b))
Here Li is the i-th circular left shift operator on Fnp and Ta is the “ multiply by a ” operator
on Fnp , i.e., for x = (x0, x1, · · ·xn−1) ∈ Fnp , we have
Li(x) = (xi, xi+1, · · · , xn−1, x0, · · ·xi−1) ∈ Fnp
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and
Ta(x) = (a0x0, a1x1, · · · , an−1xn−1) ∈ Fnp
respectively.
It is not difficult to verify that G is a non commutative group with the identity (0, 1n).
One can define the G−module structure on Fnp as follows:
G× Fnp −→ Fnp
((i, a), x) 7−→ TaLi(x)
Then we have the following Lemma.
Lemma 4.1. Let G := Z/nZ n (F×p )n be the semi-direct product of the group Z/nZ and
the group (F×p )n. There is a G-orbit decomposition
Fnp =
n∐
d=0
Ud
of Fnp , where Ud is the subset of Fnp consisting of the elements of Hamming weight d.
Now we will give an MPC protocol for computing the first different bit of two private
numbers x, y ∈ Fn2 . The main idea follows from the above lemma:
Lemma 4.2. Let p ≥ n+ 2 be a prime number, and let u = (ui)n−1i=0 be a 0− 1 element in
Fnp . Let v ∈ Fnp defined as
v0 = u0
vi = vi−1 + ui for i = 1, 2, · · · , n− 1
Thus vi ∈ In+1 for all i ∈ In. Let f be a map
f : {0, 1} × In+1 −→ Fp
(a, b) 7−→ b− 2a+ 1 mod p
Then we have min{i|ui 6= 0, i ∈ In} is the unique i ∈ In such that f(ui, vi) = 0 mod p.
Proof. First we claim that (1, 1) is the unique (a, b) ∈ {0, 1} × In+1 such that f(a, b) = 0
mod p. That is because if a = 0, f(a, b) ∈ {1, 2, · · ·n + 1} for b ∈ In+1, which implies
f(a, b) 6= 0 mod p; while if a = 1, then b = 1 is the only solution such that of f(1, b) = 0
mod p.
Now it is not difficult to see that min{i = 0, 1, · · · , n − 1|ui 6= 0} is the unique i ∈ In
such that both ui = 1 and vi = 1. Thus min{i|ui 6= 0, i ∈ In} is the unique i ∈ In such
that f(ui, vi) = 0 which finish the proof.
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Following Lemma 4.2, we will design an MPC protocol to compute the first non-zero
bit of a non-zero 0−1 vector u = (ui)n−1i=0 in Fnp , where the input is its share representation
in Fnp , and the output is a share representation in Z/nZ. The principle is that, if we define
v and f as in Lemma 4.2, and z = (f(u0, v0)), · · · , f(un−1, vn−1)) ∈ Fnp and the group G as
in Lemma 4.1, then the orbit Gz will be the unique G−orbit of Hamming weight n− 1 in
the decomposition in Lemma 4.1, which is a common information for every parts. If there
is a g = (i, c) ∈ G and w ∈ Fnp such that gw = z, then the first non-zero bit of z is (i+ j)
mod n, where j is the first non-zero bit of w.
Now we give an MPC protocol to compute the first non-zero bit of a non-zero 0 − 1
vector in Algorithm 6:
Algorithm 6: First non-zero bit: FNZ(p, n)
Input: Let p ≥ n+ 2 be a prime number, P0, P1 hold a share representation of a
non-zero 0− 1 vector u = (ui)n−1i=0 ∈ Fnp
Output: P0, P1 obtain the share representation of min{i|ui 6= 0, i ∈ In} in the group
Z/nZ.
1: P0, P1 compute vi :=
∑i
j=0 ui ∈ Z/pZ locally for i ∈ In;
2: P0, P1 compute the share representation of zi = f(ui, vi) locally for i ∈ In;
3: P0, P1 run the GMR(G, Fnp ) protocol, and P0 get an elements g = (i, c) ∈ G, P1
obtain an element w such that gw = z;
4: P1 take the only j ∈ In such that wj = 0
5: return (i, j).
The round and communication of the protocol FNZ(p, n) are the same as those of
GMR(G, Fnp ), where G = Z/nZ n (F×p )n. Explicitly one has Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Communication of FNZ(n)
Protocol offline com. online comm. online round total comm.
FNZ(p, n) n log p 2n log p 1 3n log p
4.2 MPC protocol for security comparison
In this subsection we will give the MPC protocol for security comparison. The idea is that,
for two non-zero 0 − 1 elements x = (x0, x1, · · · , xn−1) and y = (y0, y1, · · · , yn−1), if i is
the right most bit such that xi 6= yi, then (x < y) == (yi = 1).
The algorithm is as below:
Communication analysis: The SC(n) protocol uses n ED1(p), 1 FNZ(p, n+ 1) and 1
AOT(Z/(n+ 1)Z, F2), where p is a prime number with p ≥ n+ 2. The Communication is
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Algorithm 7: Secure compare: SC(n)
Input: P0 holds x ∈ Z/2nZ, P1 holds y ∈ Z/2nZ.
Output: P0, P1 get the share representation of (x < y) in F2
1: P0 writes x as the binary representation (xi)
n−1
i=0 such that x =
n−1∑
i=0
xi2
n−1−i, P1 writes
y as the binary representation (yi)
n−1
i=0 such that y =
n−1∑
i=0
yi2
n−1−i;
2: P0 puts xn = 1, P1 puts yn = 0;
3: For each bit i ∈ In, P0, P1 and P2 run the MoT(p) protocol for xi and yi
independently, and P0, P1 get the share representation ui of (xi! = yi) in Fp;
4: Let P0, P1 hold the first and second component of the share representation un = (1, 0)
of 1 seperately;
5: P0 and P1 run the FNZ(p, n+1) protocol for (ui)
n
i=0 and obtain the share
representation (i, j) of min{i|ui = 0, i ∈ In+1} ∈ Z/(n+ 1)Z;
6: P1 computes the circular left shift Li(yi)
n
i=0;
7: P0 and P1 run the protocol AOT(Z/(n+ 1)Z, F2), and then obtain the share
representation (z0, z1) of (Li(yi)
n
i=0)j = yi+j mod (n+1)
8: return (z0, z1).
in Table 4.2. The following Table 4.3 gives a comparison between our protocol and some
Table 4.2: Communication of SC(n)
Protocol offline com. online comm. online round total comm.
MoT(p) log p* 2 1 log p+ 2
FNZ(p, n+1) (n+ 1) log p 2(n+ 1) log p 1 3(n+ 1) log p
AOT(Z/(n+ 1)Z, F2) 1 (n+ 1) + log(n+ 1) 1 n+ 2 + log(n+ 1)
SC(n) (2n+ 1) log p+ 1 2(n+1) log p+3n
+ log(n+1)+1
3 (4n+3) log p+3n
+ log(n+1)+2
* p ≥ n+ 3 is a prime number.
known protocols, for example [7, 5, 8, 9]. Obviously our communication is much less.
5 MPC protocol for DReLU
In fixed point representation of real number, we usually use two’s complement to represent
a negative number, hence in order to confirm a number x ∈ Z/2nZ is not “ negative ”, we
need to check whether x < 2n−1 or not.
12
Table 4.3: Compare to exists SC protocols
n Protocol offline com. online comm. online round total comm.
n Our (2n+ 1) log p+ 1* 2(n+1) log p+
3n+log(n+1)+1
3 (4n+3) log p+
3n+log(n+1)+2
n FSS [7] ≈ 2λn ** 2n 1 ≈ 2λn+ 2n
n NPSETC SC1[5]
O(kn/ log k) if n=o(k2)
O(n) else O(n) O(log log n) O(n)
n NPSETC SC2[5]
O(kn/ log k) if n1−1/c=o(k2)
O(n) else O(n) O(c log
∗ n) O(n)
n NPSETC SC3[5]
O(kn/ log k) if n1−1/c=o(k2)
O(n) else O(n) O(c log
∗ n) O(n)
32 Our 340 446 3 786
32 FSS [7] ≈ 4096× 2 64 1 ≈ 8256
32 NPSETC SC1[5] 15120 530 12 15650
32 NPSETC SC2[5] 12568 3125 7 15693
32 NPSETC SC3[5] 12394 622 10 13016
32 GSV07 [8] 14062 1068 6 15130
32 GSV07 [9] 12352 12320 2 24672
64 Our 784 988 3 1772
64 FSS [7] 8512× 2 128 1 17152
64 NPSETC SC1[5] 31388 1120 12 32508
64 NPSETC SC2[5] 28872 4138 7 33010
64 NPSETC SC3[5] 28786 1286 10 30072
64 GSV07 [8] 29072 2208 7 31280
64 KSS09 [9] 24804 24640 2 49344
128 Our 1809 2207 3 4016
128 FSS [7] ≈ 16384× 2 256 1 ≈ 33024
128 NPSETC SC1[5] 52121 2101 12 54222
128 NPSETC SC2[5] 48031 5801 7 53832
128 NPSETC SC3[5] 47963 2239 10 50202
128 GSV07 [8] 59250 4500 8 63750
128 KSS09 [9] 49408 49280 2 98688
* Here p is a prime number with p ≥ n+ 3.
** In paper [7], λ = 128.
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In the share representation of x = u+ v ∈ Z/2nZ, one can write u and v in the binary
form
u = u0 + u1 ∗ 2 + · · ·un−1 ∗ 2n−1,
v = v0 + v1 ∗ 2 + · · · vn−1 ∗ 2n−1
where ui, vi ∈ {0, 1} for all i ∈ In. In terms of the binary form of u and v, we shall use the
notation u˜ = u0 + u1 ∗ 2 + · · ·un−2 ∗ 2n−2 and v˜ = v0 + v1 ∗ 2 + · · · vn−2 ∗ 2n−2 respectively.
Now we define P , Q be two elements in Z/2Z as
P := ((u˜+ v˜) < 2n−1) (boolean expression)
Q := (un−1 + vn−1) mod 2
Then we get the following lemma.
Lemma 5.1. The boolean value of x (x < 2n−1) is equal to P + Q mod 2 under the
identies true = 1 and false = 0.
Proof: It is known that x < 2n−1 if and only if
P and (1−Q) or (1− P ) and Q
One can reduce this boolean expression algebraically. We have
P and (1−Q) or (1− P ) and Q
= P (1−Q) + (1− P )Q− P (1−Q)(1− P )Q
While simplifying the right hand side of the above equation we get
P and (1−Q) or (1− P ) and Q = P +Q ( mod 2)
which finishes the proof of the lemma,
We will give the algorithm of our DReLU protocol in the SC(n− 1)-hybrid model by
Algorithm 8 and will give a list of the communication of our protocol in Table 5.1. And we
shall compare our protocol DReLU(n) with some exists protocol in Table 5.2 also. Note
that in both Table 5.1 and 5.2, p is a prime number greater than or equal to n+ 1.
6 MPC protocol for Select Shares
Let two parties P0 and P1 both hold share representations of x, y over Z/NZ. P0 and
P1 also hold share representation of a ∈ F2. We will give an MPC protocol to realize the
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Algorithm 8: DReLU(n):
Input: P0, P1 hold a share representation x = u+ v in Z/2nZ.
Output: P0, P1 get the share representation of (x < 2
n−1) in Z/2Z;
1: P0 has the 0 ∼ n− 2 bits of u˜ and the last bit un−1 of u, P1 has the 0 ∼ n− 2 bits of
v˜ and the last bit vn−1 of v respectively;
2: P0, P1 and P2 call SC(n− 1) for (u˜, 2n−1 − v˜) and get the share representation of
P := ((u˜+ v˜) < 2n−1);
3: P0, P1 take (un−1, vn−1) as the share representation of Q := un−1 + vn−1 mod 2;
4: P0, P1 compute the share representation w of P +Q
5: return w.
Table 5.1: Communication of DReLU(n)
Protocol offline com. online comm. online round total comm.
DReLU(n) with SC=SC (2n−1) log p*+1 2n log p+3n+logn−2 3 (4n−1) log p+3n+logn−1
* p ≥ n+ 2 is a prime number.
select share functionality such that at the end of the protocol, P0 and P1 will learn the
share representation of s which is defined as
s :=
{
x if a = 1,
y if a = 0.
Since s depends on a, we shall call a the selection bit.
Note that s = a(x− y) + y. Hence this functionality can be reduced to the spacial case
that y = 0 without any communication. Hence we only need to realize the special select
share functionality. At the beginning parties P0, P1 hold share representations of both
z ∈ Z/NZ and a selection bit a ∈ F2, and at the end of protocol they will get the share
representation of az := z if a = 1 otherwise 0.
In [4], the matrix multiplication protocol is used to realize the select share functionality.
However we shall use the G-module action protocol to do this. By our protocol, the
communication is highly cut down.
The principle of our protocol is mainly based on
az =
z − (−1)az
2
for a = 0, 1, and z ∈ Z.
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Table 5.2: Comparison to exists DReLU protocols
n Protocol offline com. online comm. online round total comm.
n Our (2n− 1) log p+ 1 * 2n log p+3n+logn−2 3 (4n−1) log p+3n+logn−1
n SecureNN [4] 0 8n log p + 19n 8 8n log p + 19n
n CrypTFlow [12] 0 8n log p + 14n 8 6n log p + 14n
32 Our 329.2 432.4 3 761.6
32 SecureNN [4] 0 1448.3 8 1448.3
32 CrypTFlow [12] 0 1781.6 8 1781.6
64 Our 771.4 972.5 3 1743.9
64 SecureNN [4] 0 4001.8 8 4001.8
64 CrypTFlow [12] 0 3225.4 8 3225.4
128 Our 1794.5 2189.6 3 3984.1
128 SecureNN [4] 0 8994.2 8 8994.2
128 CrypTFlow [12] 0 7193.7 8 7193.7
* p ≥ n+ 2 is a prime number.
** In paper [7], λ = 128.
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6.1 Special select share protocol for odd module
Let a = a0 + a1 mod 2, z = z0 + z1 mod N be the share representations of a and z
respectively. Then we have
(−1)az = (−1)a0+a1(z0 + z1)
= (−1)a1(−1)a0z0 + (−1)a0(−1)a1z1
= (−1)a1y0 + (−1)a0y1 ∈ Z/NZ
where y0 = (−1)a0z0 and y1 = (−1)a1z1.
Let G := {±1}, A := Z/NZ. It easy to see that A is a G-module. Hence we can use the
Cross G-module action protocol to compute (−1)az = (−1)a1y0 + (−1)a0y1 ∈ Z/NZ and
do the same operation on z− (−1)az ∈ Z/NZ. In the case that N is an odd number, then
2 is invertible in Z/NZ, and hence it easy to compute zx from z− (−1)az. The algorithm
is given as Algorithm 9.
Algorithm 9: Special Select Share SSS(N) for odd number N
Input: P0, P1 hold the share representation of z ∈ Z/NZ and a ∈ F2
Output: P0, P1 get the share representation of az ∈ Z/NZ.
1: P0 computes y0 := (−1)a0z0 ∈ Z/NZ locally; P1 computes y1 := (−1)a1z1 ∈ Z/NZ
locally;
2: P0, P1 run the CGM({±1},Z/NZ) protocol to get the share representation (u0, u1)
of (−1)az = (−1)a1y0 + (−1)a0y1 ∈ Z/NZ;
3: P0 computes v0 :=
z0−u0
2 mod N , P1 computes v1 :=
z1−u1
2 mod N
4: return (v0, v1).
6.2 Special Select Shares protocol for even module
In the case that N is an even number, the 2 is not invertible in Z/NZ, we need to modify
the protocol.
In fact, if N is an even number, a = a0 + a1 mod 2, z = z0 + z1 mod N are the share
representations of a and z respectively, one can lift z0, z1 to z˜0, z˜1 ∈ Z/2NZ respectively.
Let z˜ := z˜0 + z˜1 mod 2N , then we have az ≡ az˜ mod N for a = 0, 1.
Using the same method as in the case N is odd number, we can get the share repre-
sentations of 2az˜ = z˜ − (−1)az˜ ∈ Z/2NZ, and az˜ ∈ Z/NZ which is equal to az ∈ Z/NZ.
And the algorithm is shown in Algorithm 10.
6.3 Select Share protocol SS(N)
In this subsection we give our select share protocol based on our special select share protocol
as the following Algorithm 11. We also shall the communication of the protocol in Table
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Algorithm 10: Special Select Share SSS(N) for even number N
Input: P0, P1 hold the share representation of z ∈ Z/NZ and a ∈ F2
Output: P0, P1 get the share representation of az ∈ Z/NZ.
1: P0 views z0 as an element in Z/2NZ, and computes y0 := (−1)a0z0 ∈ Z/2NZ locally;
P1 view z1 as element in Z/2NZ and compute y1 := (−1)a1z1 ∈ Z/2NZ locally;
2: P0, P1 run the GM({±1},Z/2NZ) protocol to get the share representation (u0, u1) of
(−1)az = (−1)a1y0 + (−1)a0y1 ∈ Z/2NZ;
3: P0 computes v0 := bx0−u02 c mod N , P1 computes v1 := dx1−u12 e mod N . Here
“b c” means the floor function, and “d e” means the ceil function;
4: return (v0, v1).
6.1.
Algorithm 11: Select Shares SS(N)
Input: P0, P1 hold the share representation of x, y ∈ Z/NZ and a ∈ F2
Output: P0, P1 get the share representation of a(y − x) + x ∈ Z/NZ;
1: P0, P1 compute z := y − x ∈ Z/NZ;
2: P0, P1 run the SSS(N) protocol to compute v = az ∈ Z/NZ;
3: P0, P1 compute u = v + x ∈ Z/NZ
4: return (u0, u1).
7 MPC protocol for ReLU
In fixed point representation of real number, we usually use two’s complement to represent
a negative number, hence to compute the ReLU(x) for a number x ∈ Z/2nZ, we need to
compute
ReLU(x) =
{
x if x < 2n−1
0 otherwise
i.e., ReLU(x) = DReLU(x)x.
We give the ReLU protocol based on the DReLU protocol and the select share protocol
as below.
Now let us compare the communication of our ReLU(n) protocol to that in SecureNN
([4]) in the following Table 7 and from now on let p be a prime number with p ≥ n+ 2.
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